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Abstract 
Agency Theory uses different compensation schemes to align conflicting 
interest between the agent and the principal. Following, Jensen and 
Meckling(1976), a vast amount of literature have dealt with equity-based 
compensation which reduces equity agency cost but have largely ignored the 
role of inside debt compensation in alleviating the debt agency cost. The 
motivation for this paper is to better understand inside debt and its impact on 
debt agency cost in managerial cost decision. Specifically, this paper will 
address the question, “Do inside debt affect manager’s resource adjustment 
decisions?” by examining the degree of cost stickiness. The findings in this 
paper are summarized as follows. First, inside debt incentives reduce the degree 
of cost stickiness. Second, CEO with high inside debt incentives cut costs more 
aggressively than CEO without the incentive. These findings support the 
hypothesis that CEO with high inside debt compensation will have incentives 
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Cost stickiness is the asymmetric cost behavior following a change in sales. 
Unlike traditional model of cost behavior which suggests a symmetric relationship 
between cost and sales, Anderson et. al (2003), hereafter ABJ, presented an 
alternative model of cost behavior. ABJ provided evidence that cost behavior is 
influenced by manager’s deliberate choice of resources committed to activities. As a 
result, the magnitude of the increase in SG&A costs associated with a sales increase 
is greater than the magnitude of the decrease in SG&A costs associated with an 
equivalent sales decrease. 
 
Prior studies have found several determinants and mechanisms of cost 
stickiness. Manager’s expectations for future sales measured by current capacity rate 
or prior sales change can affect cost stickiness (Balakrishnan et al.,2004; Banker et 
al. 2014). Cost stickiness for core activities shows a greater degree of cost stickiness 
(Balakrishnan and Gruca, 2008). Higher employment protection legislation(EPL) 
increase cost stickiness because the adjustment cost for labor is higher(Banker et al. 
2013). Demand uncertainty, bankruptcy risks are also relevant (Banker et. al 2014; 
Holzhacker et. al 2015).  
 
Although a study on managerial incentives can be an important driver of 
cost stickiness, there are relatively few studies. Kama and Weiss (2012) and Dierynk 
et al. (2012) suggests earnings management incentives can affect cost stickiness. In 
line with these studies on manger’s incentive and resource adjustment decisions, this 
paper will examine how the difference in compensation structure leads to different 




Jensen and Murphy(1990) divides compensation into compensation with 
low sensitivity to change in firm value and high sensitivity to change in firm value. 
Low sensitivity to change in firm value compensation comprises salary and bonus 
while high sensitivity to change in firm value compensation comprises stock options, 
restricted and unrestricted stocks. Many other research following Jensen and 
Murphy(1990) implicitly assumes that there are only these two types of compensation. 
 
However, there is also another portion of compensation- inside debt 
compensation. Sundaram and Yermack(2007) argue that the importance of inside 
debt on manager’s incentives and the managerial decision has been largely ignored. 
Inside debt is surprisingly common especially for large companies in slower-growth 
sectors, such as manufacturing, utility, and transportation. More than two-thirds of 
the CEOs in the Execu-Comp had non-zero inside debt in 2006. Among CEOs with 
non-zero inside debt, the mean value of total inside debt was $10 million with a 
median value of $5 million (Wei and Yermack, 2011). I specifically focus on inside 
debt incentives to contribute to the recent stream of research on debt agency costs and 
the role of inside debt. This paper specifically tests how CEO inside debt incentives 
will affect CEO’s resource decisions, which can be observed in the stickiness of cost.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The relevant literature is discussed and 
hypotheses are developed in Section 2. Section 3 presents research design and 
variable measurements. Section 4 describes the sample and Section 5 show the results 





2. Literature Overview and Hypotheses 
 
 Debt agency cost arises when managers increase the firm volatility for 
shareholders at the expense of debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is so 
called “risk-shifting problem”. To reduce debt agency cost, inside debt compensation 
is regarded as an alternative. When pension or deferred compensation is rewarded, 
CEO forgoes current compensation for future compensations, which are mostly 
unsecured1 . In other words, CEO with higher inside debt compensation ratio is 
exposed to similar risk as having firm’s risky unsecured debt (Liu et al. 2014). To 
safeguard the value of their inside compensation, CEO’s cost decision may be altered 
in a way that is more favorable to the debt holders.  
  
 In this paper, I argue that CEO’s inside debt induces a greater reduction in 
costs in response to sales decrease, or less cost stickiness. When sales decrease, a 
manager compares adjustment costs (i.e. cost of firing employees) and the cost of 
carrying unutilized resources. If adjustments costs are greater than the cost of 
retaining resources, the manager will intentionally keep slack. This results in cost 
stickiness. In other words, the magnitude of the increase in costs associated with an 
increase in activity is greater than the decrease in costs associated with a decrease in 
                                           
1 In underfunded DB plans, beneficiaries must accept anything they can get if the firm goes 
bankrupt. Also, only 15% of sample companies in Sundaram et al. (2007) were found to 
provide their executive’s pensions with so-called “rabbi” trust which secures executive’s 




activity (ABJ, 2003).  
 
Yet, for a manager with high inside debt, another cost arises to holding slack. 
Higher cost stickiness implies lower cost savings and a greater decrease in profits or 
greater loss when sale decrease. Moreover, given that the rest of the distribution of 
profits remains unchanged, this greater decrease in profits result in greater variability 
of the ex-ante profit distribution (Balakrishnan et al., 2004; Weiss, 2010). This 
imposes a risk on the probability of getting future compensation fully. Considering 
the costs of risking future compensation in cost decision, CEO will have higher 
incentive to decrease committed resource. If this paper’s results are consistent with 
the hypothesis, Dhole et al. (2015) and Cassell et al. (2012)’s findings that inside debt 
is related to lower earnings volatility and stock return volatility, which reflects the 
earnings volatility in efficient market, could be partly explained by less cost sticky 
behavior.  
 
 On the contrary, when sales rise, CEO with high inside debt are more 
hesitant of hiring a new resource to avoid any adjustment costs which they have to 
incur when future sales decrease. Therefore, only when they are absolutely certain 
about optimistic future sales, they will be willing to commit additional resources. If 
not, they will only add resources that are necessary to accommodate current sale 
increase. Yet, the impact of the incentives for sales increase will be lower than the 
sale decrease. This is because debtholder’s payoffs are fixed when firm performance 
is good while payoffs are linear when firm performance is bad. This means debtholder 
cannot get extra profit for good performance while incurring a loss for bad 
performance. Therefore, incentives to safeguard future compensation is stronger for 
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pessimistic sales.  
 
 Thus, I present following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Firms with CEO with high inside debt incentive exhibits less cost stickiness 
H2: For a given decrease in sales, CEO with high inside debt incentive cut costs more 
aggressively than CEO without the incentive.  
 
 
3. Research Design and Variable Measurement 
 
3.1 COMPREHENSIVE REGRESSION MODEL 
 
I make a modification to ABJ’s cost stickiness model. ABJ focus on 
managerial discretion for only when sales decreases. The basic model presented by 





] =  𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1




+  𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(1) 
 
where 𝑆𝐺&𝐴𝑖𝑡 are Selling, General and Administrative expenses of firm i in year t. 
SG&A are costs that occur during daily operations of a company and not directly 
related to manufacturing of the product. Items commonly included in SG&A are 
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employee salaries, marketing costs, rent and utilities and maintenance. These costs 
are generally more complicated to adjust than cost the of goods sold because they are 
often fixed recurring expenses (i.e. payroll expenses). Therefore, these uneasy-to-
adjust costs can be a variable of interest to examine the managerial intention in cost 
decision.  
 
 The coefficient, 𝐵1 is the percentage increase in SG&A for a 1 percent 
increase in sales. 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡  takes the value of 1 when sales revenue 
decreases between periods t-1 and t, and 0 otherwise. Thus, the sum of 𝐵1 and 𝐵2 
is the percentage decrease in SG&A for a 1 percent decrease in sale. Cost stickiness 
is represented by negative 𝐵2. Based on prior literature, I expect 𝐵1 to be positive, 
𝐵2 to be negative.  
 
 The extended model presented by ABJ and other prior literature includes 





] =  𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1












              + 𝐵5𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡










              + 𝐵7𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡  + 𝐵8𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐵9𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡   
              + 𝐵10𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐵11𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
(2) 
 
where Asset Intensity is calculated by 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡




]  ; Economic_Growth is the percentage growth in real gross 
domestic product (GDP) during year t. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 takes 
the value of 1 when sales revenue decreases between periods t-2 and t-1, and 0 
otherwise. I will use the same control variables for my comprehensive regression 
model presented in Equation (3).  
 
Recent studies also consider managerial resource adjustments decisions for 
sales increase as well (Kama and Weiss, 2012; Dierynk et al. 2012; Banker et. al 
2014). Accordingly, I take into account of manager’s decision for both sales decrease 
and sales increase. Specifically, I add interaction terms that enable the estimation of 
inside debt incentive on cost decision not only when sales decreases but also when 
sales increases. The control variables are added in accordance with ABJ and 
subsequent studies with only three-way interaction terms, with the assumption that 
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these control variables do not have an impact on increases in sales.2 Additionally, to 
assure that findings are not driven by industry-specific characteristics, I use industry 
indicator variables using Fama-French industry classification. In the same manner, I 
control for potential year effects. Lastly, I cluster observations at the firm level to 
control for error dependence of firm observations.  
 





] =  𝐵0 + 𝐵1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1








              + 𝐵4𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡












              + 𝐵7𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡




                                           
2 In alternative model specification, I estimated Equation (3) including two-way interaction 
terms for the control variables as well. Untabulated findings result in inferences identical to 
those in the tabulated results.  
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              + 𝐵9𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵10𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
              + 𝐵11𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐵12𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 
              + 𝐵12𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠_𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐵13𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 
+ ∑Year_Indicators + ∑Industry_Indicators + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
(3) 
 
where, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 proxy will be described in detail in the second 
section.  
  
 In the presence of inside debt incentive, the slope for sales increases is 𝐵1 
+ 𝐵3, while the slope for sales decreases is 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 + 𝐵3 + 𝐵4 + 𝐵5 + 𝐵6 + 
𝐵7  + 𝐵8  . From the two cases, 𝐵1 + 𝐵3  is in the slope for both increases and 
decreases. Accordingly, the stickiness measure in the presence of inside debt 
incentive is the difference between the two slopes, which is 𝐵2 + 𝐵4 + 𝐵5 + 𝐵6 
+ 𝐵7 + 𝐵8. On the other hand, the stickiness measure absent the incentives is 𝐵2 + 
𝐵5  + 𝐵6  + 𝐵7  + 𝐵8 . Therefore, if 𝐵4  >0, Hypothesis 1 holds. It indicates 
resource adjustments decision driven from incentive to safeguard future 
compensation reduces cost stickiness. 
 
 Greater reduction in costs in response to sales decrease indicates greater 
slope for sale decrease. If the slop for CEO with inside debt incentive is greater than 
the slop for CEO without inside debt incentive, this paper’s Hypothesis 2 will be 
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confirmed. The slop for sale decrease in the presence of the incentive is 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 + 
𝐵3 + 𝐵4 + 𝐵5 + 𝐵6 + 𝐵7 + 𝐵8 , while without the incentive is 𝐵1 + 𝐵2 + 𝐵5 
+ 𝐵6 + 𝐵7 + 𝐵8. Therefore, if 𝐵3 + 𝐵4 >0, Hypothesis 2 holds.  
 
 
3.2 INSIDE DEBT INCENTIVE MEASUREMENT  
  
I use four proxies for 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 , following concepts of 
proxies suggested by Edmans and Liu (2011), Cassell et al. (2012), Wei & Yermack 
(2011), and modifying the proxies based on Jiang et al. (2010), Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006), and Wen (2016). 
 
 First, the two CEO inside debt incentive measures constructed with level 
variables are calculated as  
 
CEO Inside Debt Incentive Ratio (Level) =𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄  , and 
 
CEO Inside Debt Relative Incentive Ratio (Level)=  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡/𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
Firm Debt/FirmEquity
  . 
 
Inside debt is calculated as the sum of the present value of accumulated pension 
benefits and deferred compensation as reported in Execucomp (defer_balance_tot + 
pension_value_tot). The value of inside equity is calculated consistent with Jiang et 
al. (2010) as the sum of fair value of stock holdings, including restricted stock 
holdings and the fair value of option holdings ((shrown_excl_opts *prcc_f) 
+opt_unex_exer_est_val +opt_unex_unexer_est_val)). Firm debt is the total book 
１１ 
 




 Second, the two CEO inside debt incentive measures constructed with delta 
variables are calculated as  
 
CEO Inside Debt Incentive Ratio (Change)= △𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 △𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄ , and  





This measure alleviates the concern of level measure by capturing a different 
perspective of the incentive. Whereas Edmans and Liu (2011), Cassell et al. (2012), 
Wei & Yermack (2011) calculate CEO equity-based incentives as the how one dollar 
change in the value of the firm affects the value of the CEO’s inside equity claims, I 
estimate how a one percentage point increase in the company stock price affects the 
value of the CEO’s inside equity claims. This approach is consistent with Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006), Jiang et al. (2010) and Wen (2016) in calculating executive’s 
equity-based incentives. To summarize, CEO Inside Debt Incentive Ratio (Change) 
indicates how a one percentage point increase in the company stock price affects the 
value of the CEO’s inside debt versus inside equity claims whereas, CEO Inside Debt 
Relative Incentive Ratio (Change) scales this measure by how a one percentage point 
increase in the company stock price affects external debt versus external equity. 
 
△𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  is constructed following Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006), as 0.01 *prcc_f *(shrown_excl_opts + opt_unex_exer_est_num 
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+opt_unex_unexer_est_num). △FirmEquity  is constructed using a similar 
approach to that used for △𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 except that there are no complete data on 
all the outstanding option issued by the firm. Therefore, as in Cassell et al. (2012), 
Dhole et. al (2015), I use the total number of employee stock options 
outstanding(optosey). Following Wei & Yermack (2011), △𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡  and 
△𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 are set as 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 and Firm Debt, respectively.  
 
 




The sample includes all public firms covered by Compustat during 2006-
2014. The sample period starts from 2006 because it is the first year SEC required 
firms to disclose their top executives’ deferred compensation plans, pension benefits, 
and other post-employment payments. From firm-year starting from 2004 to ending 
in 2014, I exclude financial institutions and public utilities (four-digit SIC codes 
6000-6999 and 4900-4999) due to their incompatible structure of their financial 
statements. The sample includes firm-year observations with positive values for sales 
revenue, total asset. As in ABJ, I excluded observations for which current (prior) 
SG&A costs exceeding current (prior) sale. To limit the effect of extreme 
observations, I delete observations for which change in sales and SG&A costs, inside 
debt incentive ratios are in the top and bottom of 0.5%. The final sample covers 
11,570 firm-year observations between 2006 and 2014. Table 1 provides details on 





[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Comparing the descriptive statistics of this paper’s sample reported in Table 
2 with ABJ sample shows a similar frequency of sales decline (28.11% versus 27.01% 
in ABJ). Also, the SG&A/sales ratio is similar (25.24% versus 26.411% in ABJ). 
Mean (median) of CEO incentive ratio (=inside debt/ inside equity) is 0.2886 (0.0210) 
suggesting that, for the majority of the sample, CEO inside equity is greater than CEO 
inside debt amount. Also, the mean (median) of relative incentive ratio is 0.5091 
(0.0342) indicating CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio is less than firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. 
Nevertheless, the average CEO inside debt holders have more than 4 million dollars, 
which is substantial in amount. All CEO inside debt incentive ratios are heavily right-
skewed. This pattern is similar to the descriptive statistic of Cassell et. al (2012). 
Following Cassell et. al (2012)’s prescription to adjust skewness, I use logarithmic 
transform for the inside debt incentive ratios and test robustness of the results. The 
results remain consistent. The correlation among the inside debt incentive variables 
ranges from 0.418 to 0.794. This indicates common variation in the measures while 
each measure capturing the unique dimension of CEO inside debt incentive.  
 
 





5. Empirical Results  
 
5.1 COMPREHENSIVE REGRESSION MODEL 
 
 I start by examining the basic model of ABJ as a benchmark (Basic Model1, 
Basic Model2 of Table 4). Next, I examine the influence of inside debt incentives on 
cost stickiness using Equation (3) (Extended Model1, Extended Model2, Extended 
Model3, Extended Model4 of Table 4). Extended Model1 uses a proxy of Incentive 
Ratio (Level). Extended Model 2 uses a proxy of Relative Incentive Ratio(Level). 
Extended Model3 uses a proxy of Incentive Ratio (Change). Lastly, Extended Model 
4 uses a proxy of Relative Incentive Ratio (Level).  
 
 All of the models have significantly negative coefficient of 𝐵2 , 
reconfirming ABJ’s findings of cost stickiness. Considering inside debt incentives to 
safeguard their compensation, the estimate of 𝐵3  is 0.094(Extended Model1), 
0.043(Extended Model2), 0.002(Extended Model3), and 0.07(Extended Model4), 
positive and significant at the 0.05(Extended Model1, 2), 0.01(Extended 
Model3),0.1(Extended Model4) level. This supports this papers Hypothesis 1 that 
inside debt incentives diminish the degree of cost stickiness.3  
                                           
3 Untabulated results also support the hypothesis 1 and 2 even after controlling for all four 
agency variables, which are free cashflow, tenure, fixed-pay, and CEO horizon, listed in 




 To test for the second hypothesis, I examine whether 𝐵3 + 𝐵4 is positive 
and significant. For Extended Model1, 𝐵3  + 𝐵4  = -0.055+0.094=0.039 . For 
Extended Model2, 𝐵3 + 𝐵4 = -0.036 +0.043 =0.007. For Extended Model3  𝐵3 + 
𝐵4 = -0.001+0.002 =0.001. For Extended Model4 𝐵3 + 𝐵4 =-0.05+0.072=0.022.  
In short,  𝐵3 + 𝐵4 is positive and significant for all models. This results support 
Hypothesis 2 that CEO with the incentives cut costs aggressively when sales decrease 
than absent these incentives. 
 
 Overall, the findings from the estimating the comprehensive regression 
models suggest that mangers’ resource adjustments are influenced by the 
compensation structure. Firms with CEO with high inside debt incentives had lower 
cost stickiness and cut cost to a greater extent. 
 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 
5.2 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
 I add two additional analysis to gain a deeper understanding of inside debt 
incentive effects. First, I test whether the incentives are affected by age, as pension 
can be withdrawn beginning at age 66. Second, I test whether inside debt has an 
additional influence even when there are other reasons (i.e. earnings management 




 For the first test. I divide the age group into three (CEO below age 60, CEO 
within age 61 to 65, CEO above age 66). The descriptive statistics show that the 
median value for incentive ratio peaks at age group 61 to 65. On the other hand, the 
mean value for incentive ratio increases monotonically with age, except for Incentive 
Ratio (Level).  
 
 Regression in Table 6 reveals the inside debt incentive effects on resource 
management decisions are primarily driven by age group 61 to 65. The cost stickiness 
measure, 𝐵4  is insignificant for age group below 60 and above 66, while it is 
significantly positive for age group 61 to 65 (Hypothesis1). Also, 𝐵3  + 𝐵4  is 
significant and positive for only those group (Hypothesis 2). Also, significantly 
negative value for 𝐵2 is only observable for the age group below 60, which may 
imply CEO with longer career horizon left, are more willing to keep slack for the 
future.  
 
For the second additional test, I test how strong the inside debt incentive is. When 
there are many other reasons to decrease committed resource, it is likely that the 
inside debt incentive effects are reduced. If inside debt incentive effects continue to 
exist for those situations as well, it shows how strong the incentives are. 
 
 





Prior literature on managerial incentive shows that earnings management incentive is 
another factor that leads to less cost stickiness (Kama and Weiss, 2012; Dierynck et 
al. 2012). I split the sample into two, one with earnings management incentive and 
the other without earnings management incentive. I follow Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), Roychowdhury (2006), Dierynck et al. (2012) in identifying the presence of 
earnings management incentives. These papers argue that firms in the interval just 
right of zero tend to manipulate earnings to meet earnings targets.  
 
 Following Dierynck et al. (2012) I use incentives to avoid earnings decrease 
variable 𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡  . 𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in 
annual earnings deflated by market capitalization of shareholders’ equity at prior year 
end is in the interval [0, 0.01]4, and 0 otherwise. Then I run Equation(3) to test the 
strength of inside debt incentives.  
 
 The expected effects for Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis2 still appeared for 
both the group with high earnings management and low earnings management group, 
except for one proxy for each group. This shows that inside debt incentives are strong 
enough to have an additional effect on decreasing more resources other than earnings 
management motives. 
 
[Insert Table 7 and 8 about here] 
 
                                           






 This paper investigates the moderating effects of inside debt incentives on 
manager’s resource adjustment decisions. This paper’s findings show that firms with 
CEO holding high inside debt ratio have less cost stickiness and greater reduction in 
response to sales decrease. For additional analysis, I show that these effects are 
primarily driven by the age group 60 to 65, which is the age group relatively close to 
start of pension receiving age. Also, inside debt incentive had an additional influence 
to the earnings management incentive to cut down resource in general.  
 
 This paper extends contemporaneous accounting literature by exploring how 
managerial incentive can affect the variations in cost behavior. Also, this paper 
focuses on debt agency cost and examine whether inside debt has an expected effect 
in aligning interest with debtholders as suggested by Sundaram and Yermack (2007). 
Compared to studies on equity agency cost, studies on debt agency cost are scant. By 
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Less:  Observations in financial institution and public utilities (37,306) 
Less: 
  Observations for which SG&A costs exceed sales for current and prior year (11,067) 
Less:  Observations with negative sale, SG&A, asset (20,055) 
Less:  Observations with missing data on other variables (22,485) 























Variable Mean std. 25% Median 75% 
SG&A  1,204.7500  3,880.4500  110.4150  277.9610  814.8800  
△SG&A 0.0658  0.1492  -0.0098  0.0603  0.1364  
Sale 6,898.5500  22,965.9700  555.4550  1,507.3600  4,567.2000  
△Sale 0.0652  0.1738  -0.0122  0.0650  0.1472  
SG&A/Sale 0.2524  0.1700  0.1187  0.2213  0.3489  
Inside Debt 4,659.6600  12,593.0400  0.0000  304.4730  3,636.4300  
Inside Equity 118,454.1700  1,217,640.1600  4,374.1900  12,924.9400  38,181.6200  
Incentive Ratio(Level) 0.2886  0.7274  0.0000  0.0210  0.2630  
Relative Incentive 
Ratio(Level) 
0.5091  1.1975  0.0000  0.0342  0.4648  
Incentive 
Ratio(Change) 
12.4876  33.1025  0.0000  1.1298  11.8080  
Relative Incentive 
Ratio(Change) 
0.2480  0.6793  0.0000  0.0191  0.2213  
Asset Intensity 0.0594  0.6227  -0.3643  0.0571  0.4602  
Employee Intensity -1.1254  0.8803  -1.5625  -1.0760  -0.6690  
Economic Growth 1.3159  1.7249  1.6000  2.2000  2.4000  
Decrease 0.2811  0.4495  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  
Prior_Year_ 
Decrease 
0.2690  0.4434  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000  









Table 3 (Pearson Correlation, N = 11,570) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 SG&A cost 1.000 
           
  
 
             
  
2 Sale 0.774 1.000 





           
  
3 SG&A /Sale 0.035 -0.137 1.000 





          
  
4 △SG&A -0.022 -0.037 0.057 1.000 




0.017 <.0001 <.0001 
         
  
5 △Sale -0.023 -0.017 -0.010 0.691 1.000 




0.013 0.062 0.279 <.0001 
        
  
6 Inside_Debt 0.380 0.416 -0.126 -0.043 -0.035 1.000 




<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 
       
  
7 Inside_Equity 0.163 0.085 0.018 0.048 0.042 0.037 1.000 




<.0001 <.0001 0.058 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
      
  
8 
Incentive_Ratio (Level) 0.102 0.101 -0.140 -0.099 -0.093 0.297 -0.033 1.000 




<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 







0.118 0.080 -0.053 -0.056 -0.055 0.357 -0.033 0.623 1.000 




<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 <.0001 
    
  
10 




<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 <.0001 



















0.233 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.000 0.189 0.001 0.039 0.639 0.001 0.001 
 
  
























































































B4: Inside_Debt_Incentive *Decrease_Dummy  
     *log(sale/lag1_sale)  
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B5: Asset_Intensity *Decrease_Dummy  














B6: Employee_Intensity *Decrease_Dummy  































B8: Economic_Growth *Decrease_Dummy  














B9: Decrease Dummy 
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*, **, and *** indicate significance respectively at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics that are based on 
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Table 5  
 
AGE ≦ 60 
 
61 ≦ AGE ≦ 65 
 
66 ≦ AGE 
 
Mean std. Median 
 
Mean std. Median 
 
Mean std. Median 
Present 
Age 
54.86  4.23  56.00  
 
62.84  1.40  63.00  
 
70.34  4.53  69.00  
Inside Debt 2,710.25  8,922.32  18.32  
 
6,464.94  15,334.02  959.30  
 
6,938.29  15,189.18  930.33  
Inside Equity 108,103.07  1,136,952.79  10,496.97  
 
66,231.49  371,416.75  13,110.72  
 
195,428.72  1,814,652.62  20,379.93  
CEO Incentive 
Ratio(Level) 
0.19  0.53  0.00  
 
0.40  0.89  0.08  
 





0.34  0.85  0.00  
 
0.65  1.27  0.14  
 
0.72  1.62  0.07  
CEO Incentive 
Ratio(Change) 
8.02  23.41  0.05  
 
16.96  35.65  4.55  
 





0.16  0.49  0.00  
 
0.31  0.68  0.08  
 




   
2,898  















































































B5: Asset_Intensity *Decrease_Dummy  






























B8: Economic_Growth *Decrease_Dummy  































































     
Number of Observations 
         
5,911  
           
5,911  
          
5,911  
          
5,911  
Adjusted R^2 0.5297 0.5294 0.5300 0.5296 
     











































































B5: Asset_Intensity *Decrease_Dummy  






























B8: Economic_Growth *Decrease_Dummy  































































     
Number of Observations 
         
2,898  
           
2,898  
          
2,898  
          
2,898  












































































B5: Asset_Intensity *Decrease_Dummy  






























B8: Economic_Growth *Decrease_Dummy  































































     
Number of Observations 
         
2,761  
           
2,761  
          
2,761  
          
2,761  
Adjusted R^2 0.5059 0.5044 0.5044 0.5079 
*, **, and *** indicate significance respectively at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics that are based on 
３６ 
 



























Mean std. Median 
 
Mean std. Median 
Inside Equity 4372.28 11884.2 295.501 
 
6150.18 15488.36 510.939 
Inside Debt 89247.51 840585.75 11627.87 
 
253992.5 2232766.42 23351.36 
CEO Incentive 
Ratio(Level) 
0.303436 0.7652486 0.0229547 
 




0.4948564 1.1845654 0.0329206 
 
0.59592 1.2731648 0.0633154 
CEO Incentive 
Ratio(Change) 
12.921813 34.3609002 1.1836913 
 




0.2343067 0.6363515 0.0181893 
 
0.319446 0.8514091 0.0368359 
Observations 9,364  








   PANEL A: EDEC =0 
 
Predicted  




























































































B5: Asset_Intensity *Decrease_Dummy  















B6: Employee_Intensity *Decrease_Dummy  

































B8: Economic_Growth *Decrease_Dummy  















B9: Decrease Dummy 





































































        
Number of Observations   9,364 9,364 9,364 9,364 9,107 
Adjusted R^2   0.5089 0.5096 0.5095 0.5100 0.5117 












   PANEL B: EDEC=1 
 
Predicted  






























































































B5: Asset_Intensity *Decrease_Dummy  















B6: Employee_Intensity *Decrease_Dummy  































B8: Economic_Growth *Decrease_Dummy  






















































































        
Number of Observations   2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,057 
Adjusted R^2   0.6167 0.6169 0.6179 0.6189 0.6259 








매니저 인센티브와 원가의 하방 
경직성: 
-부채 성격의 보상이 매니저의 자원 조정 






대리인 이론은 주인과 대리인의 상충하는 이익을 보상 구조를 통해 
해결하는 방안을 한가지 대안으로 제시한다. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
이후 연구들은 주로 스톡옵션 등 주식 기반 보상을 통해 자기자본
대리비용을 해결하는 데 초점이 있었다. 이에 반해, 부채대리인비용
을 해결할 수 있는 부채 성격의 보상(ex. 연금)에 대한 연구는 비교
적으로 주목 받지 못했다. 이 논문은 부채 성격의 보상이 매니저의 
원가 의사 결정에 미치는 영향에 대해 살펴보고자 한다. 구체적으로 
이 논문은 “ 부채 성격의 보상이 매니저의 자원 조정 의사결정에 
영향을 미치는가?” 라는 질문을 원가의 하방 경직성 정도를 통해 분
석한다. 논문의 결론은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 부채 성격의 보상으로 인
해 원가의 하방경직성 정도가 감소한다. 둘째, 부채 성격의 보상 비
중이 높은 CEO들은 그렇지 않은 CEO들에 비해 매출 감소 시 원가
를 더 적극적으로 감소시킨다. 이러한 연구 결과는 부채 성격의 보
상 비중이 높은 CEO들이 미래의 보상 가치를 보존하기 위해 매출 





주요어 : 원가의 하방 경직성, 매니저의 인센티브, 부채의 대리인 비용 
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